

ICE, CONFUSION, AND THE 38,000 FOOT CRASH



NICKOLAS MEANS

@nmeans



CONTENT WARNING

THIS IS A TALK ABOUT A PLANE CRASH

YOUR ODDS OF DYING ON A GIVEN FLIGHT (2018-2022):

1:13,700,000

SOURCE: "AIRLINE SAFETY: STILL GETTING BETTER?"
ARNOLD BARNETT & JAN REIG TORRA
JOURNAL OF AIR TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT

YOUR ODDS OF DYING ON A GIVEN "SAFER" FLIGHT (2018-2022):

1:~80,000,000

SOURCE: "AIRLINE SAFETY: STILL GETTING BETTER?"
ARNOLD BARNETT & JAN REIG TORRA
JOURNAL OF AIR TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT

GERMANY 3V3 BASKETBALL WINS GOLD





866

PARIS GOLD MEDALS



866

PARIS GOLD MEDALS

8,100,000,000

GLOBAL POPULATION

866

PARIS GOLD MEDALS

8,100,000,000

GLOBAL POPULATION

1:9,353,349

YOUR PERSONAL ODDS OF WINNING AN OLYMPIC GOLD MEDAL, JUST BY BEING ALIVE IN 2024

A photograph of four female basketball players from the German national team celebrating their victory. They are all smiling and holding their gold medals. They are wearing dark blue team jerseys with "GERMANY" and the Olympic rings logo. The background is a blurred basketball court.

8.6X

**MORE LIKELY TO WIN AN OLYMPIC GOLD MEDAL
THAN DIE IN A PLANE CRASH**

AIR FRANCE AIRBUS A330-203 F-GZCP





RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

GALEÃO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT • MAY 31, 2009



**CAPTAIN
MARC DUBOIS**



**FIRST OFFICER
PIERRE-CÉDRIC BONIN**



**FIRST OFFICER
DAVID ROBERT**




**CAPTAIN
MARC DUBOIS**





**FIRST OFFICER
PIERRE-CÉDRIC BONIN**



**FIRST OFFICER
DAVID ROBERT**







French Guiana

Brazil

@nme ars

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ATC REPORTING MENU, AIRBUS A330 CDU





AFR4P AF4 B77W Air France flightradar24



Tracked by satellite 3,645 km, 04:09 ago 2,209 km, in 03:05

More AF4 information

AIRCRAFT TYPE (B77W)	Boeing 777-328(ER)
REGISTRATION	COUNTRY OF REG.
F-GSQU	
SERIAL NUMBER (MSN)	AGE (Mar 2007)
32847	17 years

Recent F-GSQU flights

BAROMETRIC ALT.	VERTICAL SPEED
35,000 ft	0 fpm
GPS ALTITUDE	TRACK
N/A	267°

Speed & Altitude graph

GROUND SPEED	TRUE AIRSPEED
494 kts	N/A
INDICATED AIRSPEED	MACH
N/A	N/A

WIND	TEMPERATURE
N/A	N/A

FIR/UIR	
N/A	

Data source - Satellite

ICAO 24-BIT ADDRESS	SQUAWK
394A14	N/A
LATITUDE	LONGITUDE
49.07806	-48.27887

flightradar24 Travelers


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Settings Weather Filters Widgets Playback

ATC REPORTING MENU, AIRBUS A330 CDU







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INTERTROPICAL CONVERGENCE ZONE

ITCZ





@nme ars

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Cabo Verde

POMAT

TASIL

ORARO

SALPU

INTOL

Senegal

The Gambia

Guinea-Bissau

Sierra Leone

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TIMELINE

2:48 AM UTC – DAKAR INFORMS SAL TO EXPECT 447 OVER POMAT AT 3:45 AM UTC



TIMELINE

2:48 AM UTC – DAKAR INFORMS SAL TO EXPECT 447 OVER POMAT AT 3:45 AM UTC

3:54 AM UTC – SAL CONTACTS DAKAR TO CONFIRM ESTIMATE



TIMELINE

2:48 AM UTC – DAKAR INFORMS SAL TO EXPECT 447 OVER POMAT AT 3:45 AM UTC

3:54 AM UTC – SAL CONTACTS DAKAR TO CONFIRM ESTIMATE

4:08 AM UTC – SAL CONTACTS DAKAR AGAIN; STILL NO CONTACT



TIMELINE

2:48 AM UTC – DAKAR INFORMS SAL TO EXPECT 447 OVER POMAT AT 3:45 AM UTC

3:54 AM UTC – SAL CONTACTS DAKAR TO CONFIRM ESTIMATE

4:08 AM UTC – SAL CONTACTS DAKAR AGAIN; STILL NO CONTACT

4:11 AM UTC – DAKAR ASKS AF459 TO ATTEMPT TO RAISE AF447



TIMELINE

2:48 AM UTC – DAKAR INFORMS SAL TO EXPECT 447 OVER POMAT AT 3:45 AM UTC

3:54 AM UTC – SAL CONTACTS DAKAR TO CONFIRM ESTIMATE

4:08 AM UTC – SAL CONTACTS DAKAR AGAIN; STILL NO CONTACT

4:11 AM UTC – DAKAR ASKS AF459 TO ATTEMPT TO RAISE AF447

4:20 AM UTC – AF459 REPLIES THEY'VE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL



TIMELINE

2:48 AM UTC – DAKAR INFORMS SAL TO EXPECT 447 OVER POMAT AT 3:45 AM UTC


3:54 AM UTC – SAL CONTACTS DAKAR TO CONFIRM ESTIMATE

4:08 AM UTC – SAL CONTACTS DAKAR AGAIN; STILL NO CONTACT

4:11 AM UTC – DAKAR ASKS AF459 TO ATTEMPT TO RAISE AF447

4:20 AM UTC – AF459 REPLIES THEY'VE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL

4:37 AM UTC – DAKAR CHECKS WITH SAL AGAIN





Cabo Verde

POMAT

TASIL

ORARO

SALPU

INTOL



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Cabo Verde

POMAT

?

TASIL

ORARO

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São Luís

Fortaleza

Senegal

The Gambia

Guinea-Bissau

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POMAT

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INTOL

Senegal

The Gambia

Guinea-Bissau

Sierra Leone



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
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PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM


CAPT



PITOT TUBE




A330 PITOT TUBES




STATIC PORTS

CAPT





F/O




**STATIC PORTS
DO NOT PLUG OR DEFORM HOLES.
AREA WITHIN RED LINE MUST BE
SMOOTH AND CLEAN.**

PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM

CAPT




"ABNORMALLY HIGH RATE OF DESCENT"



RECOVERY OF VERTICAL STABILIZER




PITOT TUBE



RECOVERY OF VERTICAL STABILIZER



RECOVERY OF COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER



BEA/ecpa.d



Cabo Verde

POMAT

TASIL

ORARO

SALPU

INTOL




MAP DATA: ©2024 GOOGLE, INEGI, FAIR USE

**"[WE SHOULD TRY] TO ASK THE THREE SIX
NON STANDARD BECAUSE WE'RE
REALLY AT THE LIMIT"**

– FIRST OFFICER BONIN 1:50:21 UTC



INTERTROPICAL CONVERGENCE ZONE STORM HEIGHT



"ALL WE NEEDED WAS MISTER SAINT-ELMO"

TASIL – CAPTAIN DUBOIS 1:51:21 UTC

ORARO

SALPU

INTOL



ST. ELMO'S FIRE



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PHOTO: REDDIT USER HOOKIEBOOKIE_, FAIR USE


**"IT'S GOING TO BE TURBULENT
WHEN I GO FOR MY REST"**

- CAPTAIN DUBOIS 1:51:58 UTC



"WELL THEN, I'M OUT OF HERE."

– CAPTAIN DUBOIS 2:00:08 UTC



**"DON'T YOU MAYBE WANT TO GO
TO THE LEFT A BIT?"**

- FIRST OFFICER ROBERT 2:08:03 UTC




"YOU DID SOMETHING TO THE A/C?"

– FIRST OFFICER BONIN 2:08:36 UTC



"WHAT'S THAT SMELL, NOW?"

– FIRST OFFICER BONIN 2:08:41 UTC



ORARO

SALPU

INTOL



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"I HAVE THE CONTROLS"

– FIRST OFFICER BONIN 2:10:06 UTC



ORARO

SALPU

INTOL




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MedScout

PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM

CAPT





"WHAT IS THAT?!"
- FIRST OFFICER BONIN 2:10:11 UTC

A330 FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS



AUTO FLT AP OFF

AUTO FLT A/THR OFF

-THR LEVERS.....MOVE

F/CTL ALTN LAW
(PROT LOST)

-MAX SPEED.....330/.82

AUTO FLT

AIRBUS A330 COCKPIT




AIRBUS A330 COCKPIT



PHOTO: EDWIN LEONG, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, CC BY-SA 2.0

AIRBUS A330 NORMAL LAW




AIRBUS A330 ALTERNATE LAW



"WE HAVEN'T GOT A GOOD DISPLAY OF SPEED"

TASIL – FIRST OFFICER BONIN 2:10:15 UTC




ORARO

SALPU

INTOL

"ALTERNATE LAW, PROTECTIONS LOW."

– FIRST OFFICER ROBERT 2:10:22 UTC



"WATCH YOUR SPEED"

FO ROBERT, 2:10:28 UTC



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MedScout

"WATCH YOUR SPEED"

FO ROBERT, 2:10:28 UTC

"OKAY, OKAY OKAY I'M GOING BACK DOWN"

FO BONIN, 2:10:28 UTC



"WATCH YOUR SPEED"

FO ROBERT, 2:10:28 UTC

"OKAY, OKAY OKAY I'M GOING BACK DOWN"


FO BONIN, 2:10:28 UTC

**"ACCORDING TO ALL THREE YOU'RE GOING UP,
SO GO BACK DOWN"**


FO ROBERT, 2:10:33 UTC



A330 PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAY




NORMAL LAW




ALTERNATE LAW

A330 PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAY




NORMAL LAW




ALTERNATE LAW

A330 PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAY




NORMAL LAW




ALTERNATE LAW

A330 PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAY




NORMAL LAW



ALTERNATE LAW

A330 PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAY, ALT. LAW



AUTOTRIM





DIAGRAM: AIRBUS INDUSTRIE, FAIR USE

AUTOTRIM




AIRBUS A330 COCKPIT



"STALL! STALL!"

– THE PLANE, 2:10:51 UTC





"I'M IN TOGA"

– FIRST OFFICER BONIN, 2:11:03 UTC




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2:11:10 AM UTC
38,000 FT



Cabo Verde
POMAT

TASIL

ORARO


SALPU

INTOL



**"BUT WE'VE GOT THE ENGINES.
WHAT'S HAPPENING?
DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT'S
HAPPENING OR NOT?"**

– FIRST OFFICER ROBERT, 2:11:21 UTC



"I DON'T HAVE CONTROL OF THE AIRPLANE ANY MORE NOW."

I DON'T HAVE CONTROL OF THE AIRPLANE AT ALL."

– FIRST OFFICER BONIN, 2:11:34 UTC



"WHAT'S GOING ON HERE? TELL ME WHAT'S GOING ON!"

– CAPTAIN DUBOIS, 2:11:42 UTC

INTOL

SALPU

ORARO

TASIL

POMAT

Cabo Verde



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MAP DATA: ©2024 GOOGLE, INEGI, FAIR USE



**"WE LOST ALL CONTROL OF THE AIRPLANE.
WE DON'T UNDERSTAND ANYTHING.
WE'VE TRIED EVERYTHING."**

FIRST OFFICER ROBERT, 2:11:46 UTC








"IT'S IMPOSSIBLE"
– CAPTAIN DUBOIS, 2:12:43 UTC




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"CLIMB CLIMB CLIMB CLIMB"

FIRST OFFICER ROBERT, 2:13:39 UTC

"BUT I'VE BEEN AT MAXIMUM NOSE UP FOR A WHILE."

FIRST OFFICER BONIN, 2:13:40 UTC

"NO NO NO! DON'T CLIMB!"

CAPTAIN DUBOIS, 2:13:42 UTC



2:14:28 AM UTC



MAP DATA: ©2024 GOOGLE, INEGI, FAIR USE

2:14:28 AM UTC



**CAPTAIN
MARC DUBOIS**



**FIRST OFFICER
PIERRE-CÉDRIC BONIN**



**FIRST OFFICER
DAVID ROBERT**

SOCATA TB10



ROLLADEN-SCHNEIDER LS4 GLIDER



Ironies of Automation*

LISANNE BAINBRIDGE†

Key Words—Control engineering computer applications; man-machine systems; on-line operation; process control; system failure and recovery.

Abstract—This paper discusses the ways in which automation of industrial processes may expand rather than eliminate problems with the human operator. Some comments will be made on methods of alleviating these problems within the 'classic' approach of leaving the operator with responsibility for abnormal conditions, and on the potential for continued use of the human operator for on-line decision-making within human-computer collaboration.

Irony: combination of circumstances, the result of which is the direct opposite of what might be expected.

Paradox: seemingly absurd though perhaps really well-founded statement.

THE classic aim of automation is to replace human manual control, planning and problem solving by automatic devices and computers. However, as Bibby and colleagues (1975) point out: "even highly automated systems, such as electric power networks, need human beings for supervision, adjustment, maintenance, expansion and improvement. Therefore one can draw the paradoxical conclusion that automated systems still are man-machine systems, for which both technical and human factors are important." This paper suggests that the increased interest in human factors among engineers reflects the irony that the more advanced a control system is, so the more crucial may be the contribution of the human operator.

This paper is particularly concerned with control in process industries, although examples will be drawn from flight-deck automation. In process plants the different modes of operation may be automated to different extents, for example normal operation and shut-down may be automatic while start-up and abnormal conditions are manual. The problems of the use of automatic or manual control are a function of the predictability of process behaviour, whatever the mode of operation. The first two sections of this paper discuss automatic on-line control where a human operator is expected to take-over in abnormal conditions, the last section introduces some aspects of human-computer collaboration in on-line control.

1. Introduction

The important ironies of the classic approach to automation lie in the expectations of the system designers, and in the nature of the tasks left for the human operators to carry out.

The designer's view of the human operator may be that the operator is unreliable and inefficient, so should be eliminated from the system. There are two ironies of this attitude. One is that

designer errors can be a major source of operating problems. Unfortunately people who have collected data on this are reluctant to publish them, as the actual figures are difficult to interpret. (Some types of error may be reported more readily than others, and there may be disagreement about their origin.) The second irony is that the designer who tries to eliminate the operator still leaves the operator to do the tasks which the designer cannot think how to automate. It is this approach which causes the problems to be discussed here, as it means that the operator can be left with an arbitrary collection of tasks, and little thought may have been given to providing support for them.

1.1. *Tasks after automation.* There are two general categories of task left for an operator in an automated system. He may be expected to monitor that the automatic system is operating correctly, and if it is not he may be expected to call a more experienced operator or to take-over himself. We will discuss the ironies of manual take-over first, as the points made also have implications for monitoring. To take over and stabilize the process requires manual control skills, to diagnose the fault as a basis for shut down or recovery requires cognitive skills.

1.1.1. *Manual control skills.* Several studies (Edwards and Lees, 1974) have shown the difference between inexperienced and experienced process operators making a step change. The experienced operator makes the minimum number of actions, and the process output moves smoothly and quickly to the new level, while with an inexperienced operator it oscillates round the target value. Unfortunately, physical skills deteriorate when they are not used, particularly the refinements of gain and timing. This means that a formerly experienced operator who has been monitoring an automated process may now be an inexperienced one. If he takes over he may set the process into oscillation. He may have to wait for feedback, rather than controlling by open-loop, and it will be difficult for him to interpret whether the feedback shows that there is something wrong with the system or more simply that he has misjudged his control action. He will need to make actions to counteract his ineffective control, which will add to his work load. When manual take-over is needed there is likely to be something wrong with the process, so that unusual actions will be needed to control it, and one can argue that the operator needs to be more rather than less skilled, and less rather than more loaded, than average.

1.1.2. *Cognitive skills.*

Long-term knowledge: An operator who finds out how to control the plant for himself, without explicit training, uses a set of propositions about possible process behaviour, from which he generates strategies to try (e.g. Bainbridge, 1981). Similarly an operator will only be able to generate successful new strategies for unusual situations if he has an adequate knowledge of the process. There are two problems with this for 'machine-minding' operators. One is that efficient retrieval of knowledge from long-term memory depends on frequency of use (consider any subject which you passed an examination in at school and have not thought about since). The other is that this type of knowledge develops only through use and feedback about its effectiveness. People given this knowledge in theoretical classroom instruction without appropriate practical exercises will probably not understand much of it, as it will not be within a framework which

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† Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, U.K.

"THE DESIGNER'S VIEW OF THE HUMAN OPERATOR MAY BE THAT THE OPERATOR IS UNRELIABLE AND INEFFICIENT, SO SHOULD BE ELIMINATED FROM THE SYSTEM."

DR. LISSANE BAINBRIDGE
"IRONIES OF AUTOMATION"

**"THE DESIGNER WHO TRIES TO
ELIMINATE THE OPERATOR STILL LEAVES
THE OPERATOR TO DO THE TASKS
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**DR. LISSANE BAINBRIDGE
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**"... THIS MEANS THAT THE OPERATOR
CAN BE LEFT WITH AN ARBITRARY
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PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR THEM."**

**SALPU – DR. LISSANE BAINBRIDGE
"IRONIES OF AUTOMATION"**

INTOL

AUTO FLT AP OFF
AUTO FLT A/THR OFF
-THR LEVERS.....MOVE
F/CTL ALTN LAW
(PROT LOST)
-MAX SPEED.....330/.82
AUTO FLT

**"WHEN MANUAL TAKE-OVER IS NEEDED ...
[IT'S LIKELY] THAT UNUSUAL ACTIONS WILL
BE NEEDED TO CONTROL IT, AND ONE CAN
ARGUE THAT THE OPERATOR NEEDS TO BE
MORE RATHER THAN LESS SKILLED, AND
LESS RATHER THAN MORE LOADED."**

**– DR. LISSANE BAINBRIDGE
"IRONIES OF AUTOMATION"**

Figure 1: Magic Quadrant for AI Code Assistants



Gartner



@nmeans

MAP DATA: ©2024 GOOGLE, INEGI, FAIR USE

MedScout

"BY TAKING AWAY THE EASY PARTS OF HIS TASK, AUTOMATION CAN MAKE THE DIFFICULT PARTS OF THE HUMAN OPERATOR'S TASK MORE DIFFICULT."

DR. LISSANE BAINBRIDGE
"IRONIES OF AUTOMATION"



"ONE RESULT OF SKILL IS THAT THE OPERATOR KNOWS HE CAN TAKE-OVER ADEQUATELY IF REQUIRED. OTHERWISE THE JOB IS ONE OF THE WORST TYPES, IT IS VERY BORING BUT VERY RESPONSIBLE, YET THERE IS NO OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUIRE OR MAINTAIN THE QUALITIES REQUIRED TO HANDLE THE RESPONSIBILITY."

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Select all sources


 BEA Final Report


 Brown - Automation/...

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 Faccini - 4m37s

 Langewische - Huma...

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 Wikipedia - AF447

How long was AF447 without accurate airspeed data?



Duration of Inaccurate Airspeed Data on AF447

The sources provide a timeline of the airspeed data issues on AF447, allowing us to determine how long the aircraft was without accurate airspeed data:


- **Initial Failure:** The sources pinpoint the start of the airspeed problems to **2:10:05 A.M. UTC** when the pitot tubes likely became blocked by ice crystals ¹ ² ³. The blockage led to a discrepancy in airspeed readings, triggering the autopilot disconnection and a reconfiguration of the flight control law to alternate 2B ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶.
- **Erroneous Readings:** Following the initial failure, the airspeed indications displayed on the various instruments became unreliable. The sources detail how different air data reference units (ADRs) experienced varying durations of invalid airspeed data:
 - **ADR 1:** The airspeed displayed on the left primary flight display (PFD), generally derived from ADR 1, became invalid around 2:10:08 A.M. UTC and remained unreliable for 29 seconds ⁷ ⁸.
 - **ADR 2:** The exact duration of ADR 2's invalid data is less certain. The report suggests that the pitot probe associated with ADR 2 started to freeze between 2:10:03.5 A.M. UTC and 2:10:05 A.M. UTC and definitively unfroze no later than 2:10:46 A.M. UTC ⁹. The report notes that the pitot probe on the copilot's side, linked to ADR 2, likely unfroze at least temporarily during this period ⁹.
 - **ADR 3:** The airspeed displayed on the Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS), derived from ADR 3, was also affected. The sources state that the speed on ADR 3 experienced a temporary drop between 2:10:07 A.M. UTC and 2:10:10 A.M. UTC and then fell again at 2:10:14 A.M. UTC ³. The ISIS speed remained unreliable for a total of 54 seconds ⁸.
- **Restoration of Valid Data:** The report doesn't specify a precise time when all three ADRs began consistently providing accurate airspeed data. However, the sources indicate that the pitot tubes eventually unfroze, allowing for the restoration of valid airspeed readings ¹⁰ ¹¹.

Analysis

- **Challenges in Determining Precise Duration:** The varying durations of inaccurate data across the different ADRs make it challenging to pinpoint the exact time when the aircraft regained full and consistent accurate airspeed information. The temporary unfreezing of some pitot tubes further complicates this determination.

What actions were taken by the pilots in response to the unreliable airspeed indications?

What were the limitations on flight time and rest periods in th [>](#)

 Close Chat

9 sources

Start typing...



 Notebook guide



"THE MORE ADVANCED A CONTROL SYSTEM IS, ... THE MORE CRUCIAL MAY BE THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE HUMAN OPERATOR."

DR. LISSANE BAINBRIDGE
"IRONIES OF AUTOMATION"



ICE, CONFUSION, AND THE 38,000 FOOT CRASH



NICKOLAS MEANS

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